The paper provides an overview of the problem of the plurality of legal theories characteristic of bourgeois society, as reflected in the monograph of the eminent Russian legal scholar V. A. Tumanov, published in 1971. The author arrives at several conclusions. First, there is a need to discuss the ontological dimension of theoretical-legal pluralism separately from its epistemological dimension, since the ontology of society is not directly replicated within the sphere of law but is instead reflected and legitimized therein through complex processes. Second, it remains necessary to distinguish between the causes and the conditions (factors) underlying the plurality of doctrines concerning the essence and purpose of law. Third, the specific configuration of the causes and factors of theoretical-legal pluralism must be defined differently. The morphology of social reality continues to exert a determining, yet simultaneously pre-conceptual, influence upon legal scholarship. The absence of a universally binding ideology contributes to the temporary neglect of issues situated at the metascientific level. As a result, legal thought identifies its own worldview foundations separately from methodological reflection, whereby metaphysical doctrines acquire priority over materialist dialectics. Fourth, the impossibility or impracticality of externally eliminating theoretical-legal pluralism through coercive influence upon legal discourse persists. The transformation of legal thought toward monistic orientations may occur only if society possesses a sufficient degree of spiritual freedom capable of enabling such transformation. Fifth, V. A. Tumanov’s analysis of the causes and conditions of theoretical-legal pluralism retains both relevance and scholarly significance, encouraging reflexive consideration by legal scholars of their own worldview assumptions and the conditions of their reproduction, as well as of the methodology of legal cognition in light of its multilayered character.