The paper is devoted to the political form known as the civilizational state. Trends in geopolitical development indicate that only civilizational states can serve as the foundation of a multipolar world order because other actors lack the ideological resilience and corresponding resources necessary for such a role. Russia’s distinctive teleology lies in its own state-legal mission as a civilizational state. The defining characteristics of a civilizational state in Russian history began to emerge as early as the period of the Old Russian state. The features inherent in Russian statehood as a civilizational state enabled the Russian people to preserve a relatively high degree of religious, cultural, and legal unity, to consolidate around Moscow, and to transform the state into a genuine empire. The category of «civilizational state» should be incorporated into stable legal terminology and appropriately reflected in constitutional legislation.

The paper examines the history of the formation of the domestic judicial doctrine and the concept of Russia’s constitutional identity developed on its basis. The author draws attention to the fact that the initiator of this issue within Russian legal theory was the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, which introduced the relevant concept in one of its rulings. As noted in his publications by the Chairman of the Constitutional Court, V.D. Zorkin, an important impetus for addressing this problem was provided by certain judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The paper analyzes the judgment where, in the author’s view, the vulnerability of Russia’s legal position as the respondent state became particularly apparent. This vulnerability was preconditioned by the underdevelopment of both the judicial doctrine and the scholarly concept of the country’s constitutional identity, as well as the underestimation of the achievements of Russian philosophy of law as a theoretical foundation for judicial interpretation. Special attention is devoted to the analysis of the argumentative potential of the libertarian-legal type of legal understanding, the application of which could have strengthened Russia’s legal position in the dispute by compensating for the insufficient development at that time of the issue of national constitutional identity. The analysis conducted leads the author to conclude that Russian legal theory has been insufficiently oriented toward the timely identification and theoretical reflection of pressing issues in contemporary legal practice (in this case, constitutional jurisprudence), and that it has underestimated the potential of the philosophy of law as an important cognitive instrument for understanding modern realities and resolving new and non-standard legal problems.

The paper presents the author’s conception of the role of the heroic myth of commemorative legislation in constructing frames of historical memory in Russia. On the basis of a comprehensive philosophical and legal study of Russian legislation, the author concludes that the normatively articulated heroic myth has a dichotomous legal nature. On the one hand, it makes explicit collective representations of the heroic past. On the other hand, it is intended to construct frames of historical memory necessary to sustain civic identity and national security. Accordingly, considerable attention is devoted to the principles governing the selection of historical figures to be memorialized, which are determined by the value orientations of the political elite, the external manifestation of which is found in strategic planning acts. Inclusion in the historical martyrology, understood by the author as the list of key historical figures identified in the text of commemorative laws as objects of commemoration and glorification, is limited to persons who performed a military and/or labor feat in the interests of society as a whole. At the same time, memorialization extends not only to specifically named individuals but also to certain social groups whose actions were heroic in character and contributed to the protection of national security in the past. The inclusion of the name of a historical figure or of a non-personified mnemonic nominative in the text of a normative legal act performs a number of interrelated functions: memorialization of the historical figure, constitution of the image of the historical figure, construction of a space of memory, educational and organizational functions, maintenance of civic identity, and the safeguarding of national security. Through specific examples, the author demonstrates that the heroic myth articulated in memorial legislation is of great significance for maintaining national security and civic identity in Russia.

The paper is devoted to the analysis of the phenomenon of «governmental constitutionalism» in the Russian Empire during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, namely: projects of state transformation initiated by the supreme authority. The central objects of the study are the constitutional drafts prepared at the direction of Emperor Alexander I: M.M. Speransky’s plan, Introduction to the Code of State Laws (1809), and N.N. Novosiltsev’s Draft, State Charter of the Russian Empire (1820). The paper examines the common fundamental features of the initiatives under consideration, including the aspiration to modernize governance through the creation of representative institutions (the State Duma and local Dumas, the State Sejm), the introduction of the principle of separation of powers, the grant to the population of basic civil rights and liberties, and a program for the gradual abolition of serfdom. Particular emphasis is placed on the key condition underlying all of these reforms — the inviolable preservation of the supremacy of the monarch’s autocratic power — that defines the essence of «governmental» constitutionalism as reform from above. The authors explain the complex of causes that led to the nonimplementation of the projects, including resistance from conservative circles of the aristocracy, apprehensions prompted by revolutionary events in Europe, and Alexander I’s personal indecisiveness. Although this topic is a traditional one in legal-historical scholarship, the paper underscores the enduring significance of these projects. They constitute an important milestone in the development of Russian political and legal thought, demonstrating that within the framework of official ideology there existed an alternative path for the evolution of the state order through the legal limitation of absolutism and the creation of the foundations of civil society, thereby permitting a deeper understanding of both the potential possibilities and the actual limits of imperial reform in the nineteenth century.

The paper is devoted to a comprehensive analysis of the first constitutional guarantees of workers’ rights, as legislatively enshrined in the 1918 Constitution of the RSFSR. The study focuses on the mechanisms of their practical implementation in the context of the profound revolutionary transformations that encompassed Russian society. It examines in detail the content of Articles 15–22 of the Constitution, which, in essence, laid the foundation of Soviet labor law by proclaiming the rights, fundamentally new for their time, including: the eight-hour workday, the right to rest, annual leave, and social security. The paper considers the central role of the 1918 Labor Code as the principal legal instrument giving concrete form to the constitutional provisions. It analyzes the activities of the People’s Commissariat of Labor, trade unions, and factory committees, which served as the primary institutions responsible for overseeing compliance with labor legislation. Particular attention is devoted to identifying and analyzing the contradictions that arose between the rights declared and the actual practice of their implementation, a disparity caused by the acute economic crisis, the Civil War, and the specific features of labor mobilization policy during the period of War Communism. The paper demonstrates that the transition to the New Economic Policy (NEP) required a substantial adjustment of the mechanisms for implementing constitutional guarantees and, as a consequence, the adoption of a new Labor Code in 1922. The author concludes that the experience of 1918, notwithstanding all the difficulties and contradictions of its practical realization, exerted a significant influence on the formation of international labor standards and the development of the concept of the social state, thereby underscoring the enduring relevance of this historical experience for contemporary legal scholarship.

The article examines the process of formation of the political space in Soviet Russia during the period from the policy of War Communism to the transition to the New Economic Policy. It analyzes the institutional and ideological transformations undertaken by the Bolshevik leadership of the RSFSR and the USSR in 1918–1920s. The study finds that, under the conditions of the Civil War, an extremely centralized system of power — the dictatorship of the proletariat — was created and legally закреплена by the 1918 Constitution of the RSFSR. The policy of War Communism was characterized by the total mobilization of the economy and repressive measures, which made it possible to retain power but led to a profound socio-economic crisis. In 1921, the Bolsheviks turned to the New Economic Policy as a tactical retreat, while preserving one-party control over the political space. During the NEP period, partial economic liberalization was carried out and union statehood was formally established through the creation of the USSR in 1922, thereby stabilizing the regime. The continuity of the authoritarian-centralized political system persisted throughout the period under review, although the mechanisms of its implementation evolved from military methods to more institutionalized forms.

The paper examines methods of labor resource management in the USSR during the 1950s—1970s. It analyzes materials from CPSU congresses in which shifts in labor policy can be traced. The study identifies certain problems in the organization of labor that bear similarities to contemporary issues. The key questions of labor organization in the postwar period were personnel selection, growth in productivity, material incentives, and the strengthening of labor discipline. In the 1960s, such methods of cultivating a proper attitude toward labor as persuasion and education were widely employed. Idleness, drunkenness, and bureaucratism were declared survivals of capitalism. The article notes that in the late 1960s and early 1970s the role of law as a means of governance in the sphere of labor increased, which led to the further development of Soviet labor legislation, including the drafting and promulgation of the 1971 Labor Code of the RSFSR.

The paper analyzes the interaction between local self-government bodies and religious organizations in the context of their development within the historical realities of the modern Russian state. Particular attention is paid to the innovations of the 2020 constitutional reform, which ultimately consolidated the unity of the system of public authority in the Russian Federation and thereby predetermined the current transformation of the legal status of local self-government bodies. Assessing the main directions of municipal-confessional cooperation, the author concludes that modern Russia is implementing a cooperative model of interaction between these institutions. This is preconditioned, on the one hand, by the secular nature of the Russian Federation and, on the other hand, by the need to involve civil society institutions in the process of strengthening and preserving the traditional values of the multinational people of Russia, as well as ensuring the constitutional identity, sovereignty, and State independence. Noting that the legal regulation of interaction between local self-government bodies and confessional communities is not without shortcomings, the author convincingly argues that such regulation is not constitutionally superfluous and requires further improvement and expansion, taking into account the specific national composition of the territories in which particular local self-government bodies are situated. The paper also proposes a number of constructive and well-reasoned measures aimed at enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of this cooperation.

The paper offers a multidimensional analysis of the legal model of social partnership, viewed as a fundamental institution of the social rule-of-law state. The author understands as an imperative-dispositive construct in which public-law regulation guaranteed by the state is systematically combined with private-law dispositivity realized through the autonomy of will of the social partners. The study examines in detail the internal architecture of this model, including its normative and doctrinal foundations as enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation and labor legislation. Particular attention is paid to the systemic interaction of its key elements: the tripartite structure of subjects, with the state performing a threefold role as guarantor, arbitrator, and employer; the hierarchically organized levels of implementation, including the federal, interregional, regional, sectoral, territorial, and local levels; and the legal forms of dialogue, among which collective bargaining regulation occupies the dominant place. The paper identifies and analyzes systemic dysfunctions of the model, such as the formalization of negotiation procedures, the limited effectiveness of sanctioning mechanisms, the spread of practices of «pseudo-partnership», and the fragmented inclusion of small and medium-sized businesses. In a comparative legal perspective, the Russian model is differentiated from the German model, with its primacy of sectoral tariff agreements, and from the Anglo-Saxon model, which relies on decentralized bipartism and pressure-based methods. In conclusion, the author substantiates a strategic vector for the constitutionalization of social partnership, which presupposes not a revision but a qualitative evolution of the institution through ensuring the direct effect of constitutional principles, implementing standards of social responsibility in national legislation, and fostering a genuine legal culture of social dialogue as a condition for sustainable development and social peace within the framework of achieving the national development goals of the Russian Federation.

The paper analyzes state law risks associated with the use of generative language models (AI) in the education system. Its main focus is on the threat of distortion of the mechanisms through which students’ worldview is formed, thereby transforming a traditionally pedagogical task into an issue of national security. The authors argue that, despite its outward dialogic nature, AI lacks the capacity for reciprocal reflection and value-based transformation, which leads to the substitution of independent thinking with ready-made intellectual templates, the weakening of critical thinking, and a decline in motivation for the independent pursuit of knowledge. A particular legal problem is the cultural and value imbalance arising from the predominance of alien cultural codes in global models, which runs counter to the objectives of preserving national identity and may be regarded as an instrument of unlawful informational influence. At the same time, the authors acknowledge the constructive potential of these technologies for the humanization and personalization of education. As a legal conclusion, the article substantiates the need to move from the use of commercial models toward the creation of sovereign educational AI platforms operating within a special legal regime. The key tasks of the state are identified as the development of regulatory requirements for the algorithmic transparency, cultural adequacy, and pedagogical orientation of AI as a tool, as well as the legal regulation of its use for the protection of informational sovereignty and the constitutional rights of citizens in the educational sphere.

The paper is devoted to the metaphysical and logical foundations of Aristotle’s doctrine of law and the state. In the Nicomachean Ethics, he referred to his teaching as the «science of state law», while in the Politics he called it «political science». In other words, he assigned his doctrine to the highest level of cognition — that of reason. In his pursuit of truth in the understanding of law and the state, Aristotle employed both categorical and dialectical syllogisms. Over the course of the millennia, the problems raised by Aristotle have remained central to the study of the state and the theory of law, which makes it possible to regard him as a founder of legal science. At the same time, Aristotle posed the problem of the use of the practical syllogism in lawmaking and law enforcement. On the one hand, such a syllogism is the result of the free will and rational judgment of the statesman; on the other hand, it constitutes a prescription concerning proper conduct. In the modern era, a new non-classical logic — deontic logic — began to take shape. During its formation, the problem was raised that prescriptive statements are neither true nor false. By the mid-twentieth century, thanks to the works of G. H. von Wright, the development of deontic logic was completed with this position taken into account. However, first, Aristotle’s practical syllogism, according to the philosopher’s own doctrine, is itself a prescription concerning what ought to be, and its premises are neither true nor false. Second, the development of deontic logic in the second half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries once again raised the problem of truth in law. This makes it possible to argue that Aristotle’s doctrine of the practical syllogism laid the foundation for the emergence of deontic logic.

During the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, Europe witnessed intense political and legal activity associated with the prosecution of the irrational crime of witchcraft. Beginning in the eighteenth century, European intellectual elites came to the conclusion that witches had never existed and that the alleged crimes attributed to them were a legal fiction, the product of medieval superstition and popular fanaticism, sustained by ignorant or malicious judges. The matter thus seemed closed, and discussions of trials of witches and sorcerers were thereafter often passed over in embarrassed silence, including in scholarly research. This proved to be a serious mistake, since this socio-cultural phenomenon, closely connected with political, economic, religious, mythological, legal, and other dimensions, cannot be removed from the broader picture of the emergence and development of the state and law without distortion. Fears, superstitions, and other beliefs, even as forms of the collective imaginary, serve as a foundation for the formation of legal consciousness, legal culture, and the legal system. Accordingly, the study of such socio-legal practices makes it possible to investigate more deeply the dynamics of political and legal development in early modern Europe and the «long eighteenth century» (in the unofficial terminology reflecting the rise of the modern state and the rationalization of thought). The research task posed by the author may be understood as the rationalization of approaches to the study of irrational practices and the identification of clearer criteria marking the frontier between scientific and pseudoscientific activity in legal-historical and historical scholarship. The purpose of this study is to identify the rational component of the legal thinking of the jurists who took part in such proceedings, as well as the rational foundations of the criminal trials in which witchcraft was adjudicated. In the future, this may serve as a solid foundation for specialists in the history of state and law and in comparative law. Recognition that these law-enforcement practices were not marginal phenomena will make it possible to develop scholarly fields similar to witchcraft studies, which have placed witchcraft in a broader social context, separating it from the notion of mere ignorance unworthy of study. Within the framework of such a methodological approach as comparative law, new horizons open up for research in the theory and history of the state and law of Russia, which determines the relevance of the present study.

The paper is devoted to the «nation» and the «emperor», the key concepts of the first Constitution of Brazil of 1824. These concepts reflected the originality of the conceptual framework introduced by the Constitution, as well as the principles and purposes of the institutions it established, which were based on a variety of foreign source — historical and contemporary, ideological and legal. The study determines the extent to which the framers borrowed norms of Roman public law, the French Constitutions of 1791, the Spanish Constitution of 1812, the Portuguese Constitution of 1822, the Constitutional Charter of 1814, and the ideas of Benjamin Constant in shaping the conception of the emperor. It also identifies the provisions of the French Constitutions of 1791 and 1793, the Spanish Constitution of 1812, and the Portuguese Constitution of 1822 that inspired the Brazilian constituent power in formulating the concept of the nation. Particular attention is given to the historical context that predetermined the significance of these concepts, including the role of popular political activity and the convergence of interests between the population and that part of the Portuguese royal court that did not leave Brazil. The article identifies and analyzes the characteristic features of the understanding of the nation as the people — that is, the community of Brazilian citizens; its relationship to the concepts of empire and emperor; and its significance for determining the emperor’s title, his duty to be the protector of Brazil, the representative and Head of the Nation, and the holder, alongside executive power, of the moderating power intended to ensure the harmonious functioning of the institutional system of the Brazilian Empire. The author concludes that the concepts of the nation and the emperor embodied the distinctive features of the Constitution adopted in a country seeking recognition of its independence and the creation of its own statehood, and that they anticipated both its long period of operation and its influence on constitutional drafting in a number of other states.

The paper presents the author’s view of the problem of the rational and the irrational in law as it exists in the sphere of the implementation of legal norms regulating the political process. This problem is examined through the example of the political system of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, a constitutional democratic state governed by the rule of law. A characteristic and vivid example of the irrational in the law of the Kingdom of the Netherlands is provided by the confrontational legal relations that have persisted for many years and remain unresolved to this day between such social groups of Dutch society as amateur hunters and anti-hunters — extremist elements exerting a negative influence on the mass consciousness of Dutch society. In other words, a situation arises in which, in both cases, there is open confrontation between two forms of one and the same phenomenon, namely, the rational in law, complicated by the irrationality of the Dutch political system. The author concludes that the current Dutch authorities are incapable of resolving this prolonged confrontation between these social groups, although, given political will on the part of the ruling elites and the achievement of a compromise between them, a solution could be found through fundamental changes to the political system of the Netherlands.

In the final period of its existence, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia became a victim of the clash of the economic and political interests of the republics within it. The former constituent parts of the federation, no longer wishing to remain within a single state, sought to achieve independence by all available means. As a result, the Balkan «powder keg» ignited with renewed force: the Serbs defended the right to live together under one roof, the Croats sought to establish new arrangements in their own country, and the Bosnians found themselves divided among three quasi-state entities. The reaction of the international community was severe. On 23 May 1993, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution establishing an ad hoc international tribunal tasked with condemning those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law. Grandly proclaimed the «heir to Nuremberg», it was expected to adopt the principles of international criminal justice developed by its predecessor and to mark a new stage in the evolution of international tribunals. In practice, however, it became clear that the Tribunal had been created with numerous shortcomings: legal gaps emerged that the judges were forced to fill on their own; the proceedings lasted a total of 25 years and, in effect, continue to this day; and the legality of the Tribunal’s establishment appeared questionable in the eyes of many scholars. In this article, the author examines the historical and geopolitical circumstances in which the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was created and attempts to offer independent answers to the controversial issues of international law involved.

The paper is devoted to the study of scientific data as an object of information-law regulation. It identifies the existing legislative approaches to determining the legal significance of the use of scientific information. Particular attention is paid to the problem of establishing criteria for qualifying information as scientific, as developed in judicial practice and legal doctrine. The author analyzes the legal regimes applicable to scientific information from the perspective of access to it and, as a result, concludes that the legal regime of scientific data is differentiated. The article also attempts to formulate new conceptual approaches to the public-law regulation of the circulation of scientific information. In conclusion, the author identifies the basic aspects on which further improvement of legal regulation may be based in order to transform scientific data into a systemic resource for achieving technological leadership.

The paper substantiates the expediency of studying patent law within the framework of civil law theory, which ultimately makes it possible to develop practical proposals for optimizing the protection of the objects of so-called «industrial property»: inventions, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks and service marks, and appellations of origin. Attention is drawn to the fact that the dispositive principles of civil law are increasingly, for objective and readily understandable reasons, yielding to the category of public interest. At the same time, the author argues that these circumstances, together with the development of digital («machine») technologies, should not affect the fundamental approaches to the most important and universal regulator of social relations. Intellectual property law (as well as patent law studied in our department) should not become a «law of the machine»; moreover, the necessary balance between the interests of the human being and the «machine» (artificial intelligence, smart technologies, and the like), under which there might hypothetically emerge a «law of the human and the machine», is unlikely to be secured even in the future. Law must remain the «law of the human being».